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JURUSPRUDENCE.

By Edgar Bodenheimer.

McGraw-Hill Company, New

York, 1940. Pp. xiii, 357. Price: $3.5o.
By means of an inadequate, though not incorrect, title, this excellent
book makes a bad start. For the practicing lawyer, "Jurisprudence" is
likely often to be a rhetorical synonym for law in such common applications as "Equity Jurisprudence", "Medical Jurisprudence", etc. However,
except as it presents a problem in taxonomy, the question whether this book
is properly entitled or not, has no importance.
Since, then, the title of this book does not definitely tell the reader
what lies between the covers, it becomes the function of the reviewer to
inform him.
The book has four parts as follows: I. Power and Law (dealing with
anarchy, despotism, sovereignty, custom, morals, law). The section on
Justice perhaps should have been transposed to Part II, which treats the
Law of Nature in an historical survey. Part III treats the Law-Shaping
Forces (political, psychologic, economic, national, and racial). We miss
in this enumeration of factors (though not entirely in the discussion)
chiefly such forces as the geophysical, the biologic, and the religious factors.
Part IV is a discussion of Positivism.
It is apparent that the subject-matter treated is what, in various languages, is known as "general theory of law" (e. g., Korkunov, Sforza,
Bustamante y Montoro). The German term is allgemeine Rechtslehre
(e. g., Adolph Merkel). So far as we know, this is the first indigenous
treatise which has appeared on general theory of law in this country.
Korkunovs (Russian) work (1887) is available in English (Modem
Legal Philosophy Series). In that same series is also found in English
translation the comparable book by Berolzheimer (Kulturstufen der
Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, 19o5).
As an historical survey of theories of law we have no doubt that this
work deserves and will be accorded high praise. The field surveyed is
extensive. There is no other indigenous treatise which will provide a
basis of comparison. A comparison with foreign texts only serves' to
accentuate its merit.
There are those who will contend that the author's painstaking and
informative recital of the external history of Natural Law, while creditable
as a piece of writing, has no value, perhaps on the view that Natural Law
occupies today the same scientific position as, say, the phlogiston theory.
To take this position, of course, would be utterly mistaken. It would
refuse to recognize the important contribution made by Natural Law to
that field of thought called in other days, international law. It would
ignore the capital influence of these ideas on written constitutions. It
would also fail to see the dominating r6le which this doctrine has exerted
in the past and still exerts on the structure and content of legal systems.
The idea of Natural Law has been destroyed hundreds of times. It has
in recent years been regarded as the greatest illusion that has assailed the
legal mind. The fact, however, remains that the idea survives, and it is
also a fact that it will probably survive for an indefinitely long time. As
Windscheid said in a rectoral address, "Natural Law is an ancient, neverending dream of mankind."
The author advances a Natural Law principle of his own invention.
He says: "Law in its purest and most perfect form will be realized in a
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688

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

social order in which the possibility of abuse of power by private individuals as well as by the government is reduced to a minimum." Since this is
a formula expressing an ideal which never can be realized, as the author
concedes, we wonder (perhaps too captiously) why he admits even a minimum of abuse. More seriously, we question the significance of the expression "abuse of power". What is abuse of power? When that question is
answered we may find that we have nothing more than the well-known
Kantian or Spencerian formula or perhaps the Stammlerian formula.
We have found some difficulty in understanding what the author
means hy power. Rights are a form of power according to the author.
It is not clear what distinction the author seeks to make between law and
power, since apparently "the element of coercion is not essential to the
concept of law" (p. 15). Positive rights would seem to be a creation of
law. If rights create power relations and law is not a power relation, a
latent contradiction seems to arise. Thus he says that an agreement between two persons made on a desert island (and presumably not subject
to dominion of any state) creates a "relation of law" (p. 4). We fail to
see the valid point. The author has severely criticized Kelsen because
Kelsen's norm theory includes the decrees of an autocratic ruler. The
author goes beyond Kelsen. According to his view two persons on a
coral reef may create the phenomenon of law.
Are there any limits on definition as measured by empirical standards? We believe such limits exist. One of the tests is significance. Two
persons living in an independent world of their own cannot create a phenomenon of law. A dictator who by arbitrary decree of general application
governs a people does create a phenomenon of law. The difference in
these instances lies in their significance and that significance is obvious.
We may go a step farther-suppose a dictator reserves the right to interfere with rules of general application in individual cases by arbitrary decree
which cannot be subsumed under a general rule observed by the dictatoris such a social condition a "condition of law" (Rechtszustand)? Kelsen
answers in the affirmative. The author severely criticizes this position.
He says "this view deprives the concept of law of all meaning." This
crucial example presents the problem in its best light. We confess an
enthusiastic admiration of the book under review so far as it deals with the
verifiable objective facts of legal theory, but we find it impossible to follow
the author in many of his conclusions. On the point under discussion (and
it is typical of the attitude and reasoning of the author) Kelsen is criticized
because he refuses to consider anything but a theory of norms apart from
considerations of history, expediency, or moral value. The author admits,
as he must, that in logic, Kelsen's position is unimpeachable. The author
realizes, too, that Kelsen admits, as he too must, the need of sociological
explanations and treatment of the legal establishment. On the author's
basis of reasoning, a stronger case can be made against the author himself
because he has published a book labeled "Jurisprudence" and has refused to
treat the subject of jural analytics. For the same kind of a reason, the
subject of pure mathematics is bad because it does not deal with applications. And, again, an architect who draws the plans for an apartment or
hotel building has failed because he has not drawn pictures of the furniture
and of human beings which are to occupy the structure when and if built.
What lies in the background of these ideas? We cannot be sure of
the answer since it may be based on subjective considerations. It is evident that the author does not approve of despots, but surely what even the
most arbitrary of despots decrees has a content not distinguishable in social
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importance from the laws issuing from the most enlightened democratic
government.
Another point that may be noticed, and we regard it as one of capital
inportance, is the implication that legal positivism is not merely inadequate
to explain legal reality, but that it is subject to reproach because it declines
to deal with natural law ideas. The first objection probably is well-founded;
the second is utterly wanting in merit. Legal positivism may be a legal
philosophy or it may be merely a technique. The author, we believe, overlooks the distinction. He overlooks the possibility that a legal theorist
may devote his thought, researches, and writing to what the author calls
analytical positivism and at the same time be an incurable metaphysician.
An analytical positivist may be a Kantian (e. g., Kelsen), an Hegelian
(e. g., Kohler) or he may even be a scientific empiricist in philosophy
(e. g., Cook?). We think it is even possible that a man can be a legal
positivist in his technique and methods and believe in Natural Law. And
here we may ask, "Is anyone entirely free from the seductions of Natural
Law?" We may go even farther, "Can anyone avoid a belief in Natural
Law in some one of its many forms?" Of course it may turn out that the
belief has only a visceral origin. If the implied answers follow, as we think
is inevitable, they have no relevancy on the present issue. The material
progress of the modern world is due precisely to this diversity and specialism. Whether philosophical positivism is sound or not, is not accurately
a question of jurisprudence. Positivism in jurisprudence is a mere method
or technique. It may be admitted that its postulates are subject to review
in the forum of philosophy. The chief postulate of legal positivism is that
law is a coercive legal phenomenon. We are not convinced that the learned
author has succeeded in impeaching it.
To sum up: We regard this book as a valuable and clearly expressed
statement of the problems which it undertakes. One of its interesting
features is that the author discusses with shrewd comments not alone the
frequently dissected views of the leading jurists of the past, but also with
like candor and pertinency mentions, and sometimes discusses, the views
of various living jurists-several of them Americans (e. g., Thurman
Arnold, John Dickinson, Jerome Frank, K. N. Llewellyn, Roscoe Pound,
N. S. Timasheff). There is no other similar work which is so contemporaneous.
Albert Kocourek.t
-

By R. M. Jackson. University
Press, Cambridge; The Macmillan Company, New York, 194o. Pp.
viii, ,342. Price: $3.75.
David Copperfield was warned by Mr. Spenlow that, in the practice
of the law, a gentleman takes things as he finds them. Doubtless, the Prerogative Office was not efficiently managed; but, doubtless, it would last
their time. He was right, too, said David, for the Prerogative Office survived in the teeth of a great, adverse Parliamentary inquiry. Like David,
some Englishmen have criticized the administration of justice in their own
country; others, following Mr. Spenlow, concede that the system is "a
heterogeneous growth of complex past expedients",' but they are satisfied,
withal, that English law metes out justice effectively. Americans, too, have
returned to tell us of the machinery of British justice, always with interest,
THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND.

"1
Emeritus Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
I. I HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW (I93I

ed.) 633.
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often with reverence. Recent events have enormously stimulated that interest here. News of the damage to the Temple, for example, strikes American lawyers with a sense of personal loss. Appearing at such a time, Mr.
Jackson's well written study of the machinery of justice in England,-corrected down to August, i939,-would inevitably attract attention.
But this book is not just another study of the subject. The author is
a law professor at Cambridge and solicitor of the Supreme Court. Therefore, we would anticipate a sound theoretical as well as practical discussion.
Nor are we disappointed. The book is an eloquent, well informed presentation of the whole case for legal reform,--upon two main lines of attack:
first, it is proposed to centralize British legal machinery through the establishment of a Ministry of Justice; and, second, it is planned, in legal education, to shift the emphasis from a study of the substantive rules of the
common law to the day-by-day work of courts and social legislation.
In the Preface, the author states that his book is the outgrowth of his
own teaching at Cambridge for some years, and of a belief that people, in
general, no less than law students, need to know how "the present system
works and what criticisms and suggestions have been made". His seven
chapters have the following headings: "Historical Introduction", "Civil
jurisdiction", "Criminal Jurisdiction", "The Personnel of the Law", "The
Cost of the Law", "Special Tribunals", and "The Outlook for Reform".
There is little documentation, though the author anticipates this criticism
by saying that it is not his purpose to write "an exhaustive treatise".
Throughout, the book shows a mature familiarity with legal history,
particularly in the excellent first chapter. Yet the limitations of the historical school in law are recognized, the author pointing out that Dean
Ames "could even contend that because a notion was not present in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, it has no business to exist in modern
law; . . ."2

A clear-cut picture is drawn of anomalies, inconsistencies and lack of
response to modem demands in the machinery of English law. Costs of
litigation are unreasonably high. "The expense of conducting an average
commercial action in London is £4o0 for one party; this would mean
£700 costs for the party who lost." 3 In fact, "no section of the community is satisfied with the present cost of litigation." 4 Appointments to
judicial office are "mostly the reward for faithful political service", 5 more
than so much for eminence at the Bar. There is no retiring age for justices in the superior courts. Among the magistrates, there are many who
should be retired for age. "Infirmity, particularly deafness, is by no means
uncommon." 6 "The Summary Courts are, with few exceptions, composed
of lay magistrates." 7 Arrears of work are allowed to accumulate. Furthermore, "the state of our judicial statistics is deplorable"." "We do not
know," for example, "how many of the cases that come before the Kings
Bench Division are small cases." 1 Tedious and expensive delays could
2.

Page 318, n. 3.

3. Page 247.

4. Page 248.
5.Page 132.
6. Page 133.

7. Page 135. Lay magistrates have not escaped criticism from other legal historians. George Nupkins, Esq., Magistrate at Ipswich, told Mr. Pickwick that "Duelling
is one of His Majesty's most undoubted prerogatives,--expressly stipulated in Magna
Charta,--one of the brightest jewels in the British Crown,-wrung from His Majesty
by the Barons."
8. Page 323.
9. Page 323.
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be avoided, if more judges were permitted to try regularly the same class
of cases, thus becoming specialists, and an administrative expert appointed
for the courts. The Bench is weak in its interpretations of statutes, that
is to say, "there is a continuous conflict between those who frame statutes
and those who interpret them." 10 Yet, "much of our legal system rests on
statute." "I
A comprehensive survey of the work of all courts should be carried
through, and upon that basis, a Ministry of Justice created, centralizing all
administrative agencies connected with the administration of justice, under
a responsible Minister of the Crown, as the head. This would coordinate
and unify the whole machinery of justice, eliminate useless appeals and
keep the courts abreast of their work.
Reform cannot be expected to originate from the judges. For example, conferences of judges from time to time are provided for by the Judicature Acts of 1873-5, yet, after forty years, "not a single suggestion for
change has come from the judiciary as a body." 1 2 Nor is much to be hoped
for from barristers and solicitors as a class, in respect of action for reform.
Even if a Ministry of Justice were set up, it would not be self-operating.
Mr. Jackson concludes that there must be a new spirit "which will come
from a generation of lawyers, whose training includes a study of many of
the matters that would be handled by a Ministry of Justice; this would
soon work a great change."'13 "English law and its administration through
the courts is dependent on the legal profession, and if our system is to work
well and develop in a satisfactory way, the legal profession must be properly educated." 14 "Lawyers too must see their work in its social setting." 15
"It is significant that the best enquiry into the working of a law court
has been made by an American law school." 16 The function of law schools
in supplying leaders for useful research is also recognized and emphasized. Finally, Mr. Jackson says: "If legal education paid far more attention to the analysis of social legislation, and did not 7concentrate so much
upon common law, we should slowly get a change." 1
British justice tends to be more and more localized, and legal education leaves "out of consideration the actual working of the law".' 8 Reform
is long overdue. With all his enthusiasm for reform, Mr. Jackson never
adopts the technique of Jack Cade or the Donnybrook Fair. In fact, he
says: "I do not claim that my suggestions are the only sound solution;
they are put forward more as a basis for discussion."'"
Those who might anticipate a mid-Victorian complacency or indiscriminate disparagement of the machinery of English justice in this book
will be alike disappointed. If, as Mr. Jackson says, enlightened public
sentiment is essential to reform, then he may well take credit for having
illumined the scene of action in a clear, steady light.
Hugh ..Fegan.t
io. Page 214.
ii.
12.
13.
14.

Page 304.
Page 213.
Page 320.
Page 195.
I5. Page 195.
x6. Page 32o, n. i. "A Study of Law Adminigtration. in Connecticut (1937), a
product of the Yale School of Law, under the direction of Dean Clark and Professor
Shulman."
17. Page 215.
i8. Page 319.

i9.Page 329.
t Assistant Dean, and Professor of Law, Georgetown University School of Law.
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CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CONVEYANCES.

T. Martin.

Callaghan and Company, Chicago, 1939.

By Arthur
Pp. xi, 653.

Price: $5.50.

This book appears as one of a new series of casebooks on real property, which joins the growing list of successors to Professor Gray's famous
series of property casebooks. This writer has commented upon the advantages and disadvantages of the "series" scheme of publication in another
place.' It usually places the teacher of the law of real property in a position which requires him to use at least two of the books in any series,
although he might prefer the treatment of the materials and cases selected
by different authors in different series. If he follows the latter course he
will usually find that the books do not fully supplement each other. The
one-man series of Professor Gray, and subsequent works such as those of
Professor Warren or Professor Walsh would avoid this difficulty. Where
there are several authors in the series, such as the Bigelow-Aigler series,
if a teacher wished the cases on "estates created" to go with his first
semester course, and the "covenants other than for title" to be treated in
the second course, the student must buy both books at the beginning of the
year and use portions of the books at varying intervals. The Fraser-Kirkwood series could not be adapted to the Madden-Bigelow book, nor could
the Powell-Handler series be used interchangeably with the others, though
the Handler book could be used with the Frazer volumes, and with the
cheerful cooperation of the writer's colleagues in Contracts and Equity.
All of this seems necessary background in estimating the production
of Dean Martin now under examination, for the area and content of the
work, though not the personal treatment of the subject-matter, is dependent
upon the position of the book in the "series".
Apparently the plan of the "series" was to limit Dean Martin closely
to the portion of the field of property law designated by some as "Conveyancing" and by others as "Titles". Within this area he has treated
his subject matter in an original and modem manner, limited only by certain conventional partition walls, and not entirely by them. His book is
divided into four main parts: The Conveyance; Impinging Doctrines; The
Recording System; and Title Registration.
The first main division is divided into the conventional: History, Execution, Content and Form, Description, and Covenants for Title. The
Historical Survey is a nineteen page article by the author and one case
completes that chapter. Alas, poor Uses! I knew him well.
The second heading, Impinging Doctrines, is his own classification of
the materials covering Estoppel by Deed, Adverse Possession and User,
and materials on Zoning Laws, Lis Pendens, and Statutory Liens. The
last named is treated rather summarily. Perhaps enough is given to make
it provocative and stimulating under the later treatment of Marketable
Title. Some property law teachers might prefer to have adverse possession and user treated as impinging on possessory rights in land. The title
is an acknowledgment that the author recognizes the topics as impinging
on a narrow view of conveyancing.
In part three, The Recording System, we find well selected modern
cases, which afford a basis for comparison and contrast between the laws
and decisions of various jurisdictions. Cases containing full discussion of
the various issues have been selected wisely for that reason. Material on
Title Insurance has been presented here, with some cases.
The fourth part, Title Registration, contains some excellent excerpts
from writers on the subject, and some leading cases.
i. Book Review (1932)

18 ST. Louis L. Rzv. 174.
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Such is the subject matter in outline, and within the limits set, any
other arrangement would be unsuitable. Dean Martin's contributions in
treatment are original, valuable, and extensive. Throughout the various
sections he has reduced the compass of the book by original summaries
and explanations, and by excerpts from well chosen law review articles or
text-books. This treatment gets away from the traditional casebook technique, replaces some case material, saves space, and assures the teacher
that all members of his class are exposed to at least a minimum of extracase materials, usually referred to by the instructor or in footnotes. The
limited number of copies of such materials in most libraries usually prevents
the entire class membership from making use thereof and interest in "outside reading" lags. The footnotes are numerous and refer to additional
materials of a quanitative or condensed type, as well as to additional cases.
They contain many cross-references to prior or subsequent cases for contrast or comparison, and this unifies the subject and multiplies the case
material on a point without adding to their bulk. The above very desirable
features appear throughout the book, eliminating the over-crowded appearance frequently observed, and aiding the author in attaining the object
stated in the preface, to furnish "a basis for visualizing and appraising a
system of conveyances."
Teachers are further assured of having in the hands of all students
materials included in the book, such as typical forms of deeds and other
types of conveyance, an illustration of an abstract of title, a brief discussion
of curative acts, a title insurance policy, and an excerpt from Mr. Notnagel's Check List for Use in Real Estate Transactions,quoted from with
special reference to tax liens. The foregoing statements show that the
presentation of materials by Dean Martin is along presently developing
lines and the cases selected for study are chiefly from American courts,
and largely of recent date. Within the confines of the field treated the
product is a very teachable book which has departed from traditional patterns of casebook technique, not in its law, but in the selection of and
treatment of materials for teaching purposes. Why implied easements,
easements of necessity, and easements implied from quasi-easements appear
in this connection and easements created by grant and by reservation are
to appear in the other volume is not clear. The cases are, of course, problems in construction, and in this book, as in most books, more is taught
from construction than from models. Perhaps the embryo conveyancer
may be thus warned not to leave such matters to construction.
Cross-reference on page 289 directs the reader to the first volume
where covenants other than for title are to be found. It does seem that
so good and modern a book might have found room for the conveyancing
phase of such covenants. Blackstone's formal parts of a deed (p. 129)
does indicate where such provisions should be inserted in the deed. Cases
on Reservations and Exceptions are included (pp. 196-2o6) but draftmanship, as such, appears only incidentally, and conveyancing involves the
foregoing as well as many other complex problems. Perhaps we have in
mind a course in the drafting of legal instruments. At any rate authors
in this field are not stressing, openly, drafting, drafting and more drafting
to "prepare the law student to render those non-litigious services" (preface). We must teach the principles, but we cannot overlook what men are
doing and want done. Professors Leach and Powell have pointed out how
closely the problem of draftmanship is interwoven with the study of future
interests, wills, and trusts, as well as deeds and leases. "Our law courses,
aimed largely at producing a lawyer who knows neither the uses to which
his techniques are put, nor the impacts of fact out of which his techniques
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emerged, turn out at best a man under a handicap; more typically, they
fail even to teach him his techniques; only the gifted learn in vacuo." 2
Chas. E. Cullen.t
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX.

By Roy G. Blakey and Gladys C. Blakey.

Longmans, Green and Co., New York, I94O. Pp. xvii, 64o.

Price:

$7.50.

Taxation literature is lacking in good studies of the legislative development of the principal taxes. Such studies are needed both by the tax
economists who center their attention on the more general aspects of revenue problems and by the tax lawyers who are concerned with the details
of the case law and the statutory provisions. This book, which is a history
of federal income tax legislation from the Civil War days to 1939, fills part
of the gap and does it well.
The first 478 pages of the book are organized on a chronological basis
with a chapter devoted to each of the principal income tax acts. The
political and fiscal background of the various acts is outlined and the discussion in the Congressional Committees and on the floor of the House
and Senate is summarized. These chapters contain an excellent description of the setting of the different revenue acts and the conditions out of
which they grew. This was a task well worth performing, but the authors
might have given a better picture of the legislative process as it operates in
the development of the tax structure, if they had devoted less space to the
political battles over rates and exemptions, and given more attention to the
development of the policies involved in such portions of the statutes as
those relating to capital gains or the provisions governing the taxation of
trust income. For example, the chapter on the epoch making Act of 1921
might well have been expanded along this line, although, of course, a
detailed study of the statutory law is not within the scope of a book of
this kind.
The concluding chapters are devoted to a topical discussion of the
definition of taxable income, rates and exemptions, and administration.
This book will not furnish the lawyer material for his brief, but it will
repay his study if he is interested in the general development of the income
tax.

Paul W. Bruton.t
CONQUEST AND MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE LEGAL LIMITATIONS
ON THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY CONQUEST. By Matthew M.

McMahon.
233.

Catholic University Press, Washington, I94O. Pp. vi,

Price: $2.oo.

This work is an examination of the "obstacles and bars to the application of conquest" as a valid basis for title to determine to what extent these
"bars may be interpreted as legal limitations . . ." (Preface, p. v).

Con-

quest is defined "as a coercive act whereby territory is acquired .

* *

through belligerent operations, or by measures short of war . . ." (p.
14). The author surveys the opinions of writers from St. Augustine on,

showing that Vattel laid down the rule that conquest conferred lawful title
and pointing out that this view has been shared by many modern writers
and by various tribunals. In his opinion, however, there is a growing
2. Book Review (1926) 4o HARV. L. REy. 42, 45.

t Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
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opposition to conquest as a valid basis for title. What concerns him more
is whether there are actual legal limitations on conquest. He maintains
that there are three: certain fundamental principles dealing with the rights
and duties of states, many multilateral treaties, and thd policies of nonrecognition and non-intervention. His conclusion is that "despite recurrent
wars, the growth of peaceful change and the legal restrictions on the use of
force in the relations of states have tended to make the act of conquest
illegal." (p. 214).
The study ranges through a wide body of literature not only on conquest but on related topics. Some of the latter are treated at greater length
than is necessary for the purpose of the book or are buttressed by quotations which might have been omitted or summarized. The author has done
well in laying bare the anomaly of modem international law which, on the
one hand, upholds the sovereignty and independence of states and, on the
other, recognizes the violation of these rights as a mode of acquiring good
title to territory. Though he sympathizes with the view that the character
of conquest is non-juristic, he gives a full discussion of writers who disagree. At the conclusion of his study of treaties limiting or, in the case of
Pan-America, eliminating conquest as a legal mode of acquisition, he recognizes that they will not end wars of aggrandizement but will make it
impossible for states to justify such action. After repeating the familiar
narrative of recent practices regarding non-recognition, the author is forced
to conclude that the case of Manchuria may furnish a precedent, but that
policy has not yet crystallized in a rule of law. The policy of nonintervention is of still more doubtful force.
In general, it may be said that this book will not change the opinion
of the positivist about conquest, but it does present an earnest and wellconsidered statement of the materials on the subject.
Alice Morrissey McDiarmid.t
BOOK NOTES

How ro PRoVE A PRIMA FACI CASE.

(Revised and enlarged edition.)

By Howard Hilton Spelman. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1939.
Pp. xviii, 815. Price: $7.50.
Many recent graduates of law school feel that the greatest gap in their
legal education is in the field of actual trial work-in the preparation of
cases for trial, and in courtroom technique. This important and eminently
practical field of law has been almost completely neglected by the law
schools. There are arguments both pro and con as to whether the curricula
of the law schools should be broadened to include practice in this type of
work, but the fact remains that the actual conduct of a trial is a virtual
mystery to the young attorney newly admitted to the practice of law.
It was in the attempt to alleviate this situation that this book was originally written, and Mr. Spellman has ably carried on this effort with his
work in revising and greatly enlarging the second edition. This volume is
not a profund treatise on the law, nor does it contain searching analyses of
intricate legal problems. The authors specifically disclaim any such intention. Their purpose has been to create an intensely practical book that
will give the practitioner an idea of the basic facts that must be proved in
various selected types of cases and a point of departure for further study
of the legal propositions applicable to the peculiar factual situation of each
individual case. Each chapter deals with a separate legal situation, and
t Instructor, Carnegie Institute of Technology.
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commences with a sample examination of witnesses designed to indicate
the essential testimony that must be produced to establish a prima facie
case. There follows a series of Hints by the author pointing out the most
important rules of law applicable and illustrated by quotations from leading cases. Although these quotations are taken primarily from New York
decisions, a selection of source cases from all jurisdictions is included at the
end of each chapter.
There has been added to the original edition an important new section
in which a number of situations common to many causes of action are developed. In this division are included chapters on such frequently recurring
subjects as expert testimony, proof of telephone conversations, and the
introduction of documentary evidence. The final part of the book is devoted
to a presentation of two complete trials. This is of particular value to a
young lawyer desirous of obtaining some insight into the intricacies of
court procedure.
It is of course true that the actual conduct of litigation cannot be
learned from books, and that proficiency in this line can only be attained
through long experience. However, "How to Prove a Prima Facie Case"
does serve a valuable purpose by indicating the essential elements of the
various causes of action and by attempting to show the pitfalls that must
be avoided.
Robert W. Sayre.t
JURISDICTION AND

PRACTICE OF THE COURTS

OF THE UNITED

STATES.

(Fourth Edition.) By Charles W. Bunn. West Publishing Company, St. Paul, 1939. Pp. ix, 257. Price: $2.00.
This book is an attempt to condense into some 212 small pages of large
type a treatment of the salient points in federal jurisdiction and procedure.
To the extent of the success achieved, it is significant because of its very
brevity, paucity of citation and summary treatment.
Most of its inaccuracies-and they are not few-have been pointed
out elsewhere. 1 They should serve as a warning to anyone who might
regard the book as the last word on any specific problem in the field. Furthermore, there are numerous ommissions which might have been filled at
the expense of the 45 pages devoted to tables and index, unquestionably a
waste of space in this case. For example, there is nothing on equity practice; nor does any hint about criminal procedure appear, although there is
a brief summary of criminal jurisdiction. In the section on state law as
applicable in the federal courts, less discussion could have been given to the
situation where the highest court of a state reverses its own previous decision, and more to the everyday questions of conflict of laws which are now
more acute as a result of the recognition
by the federal courts of its basic
2
principle in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins.
Such deficiencies, however, should not obscure the principal value of
the work. Any student or practitioner who is totally unacquainted with
the subject will do well to invest the few hours necessary to go through its
pages, even though it cannot be used as a hornbook. Giving, as it does, a
bird's-eye view of the field, its plan should have served as a model, since it
was first issued over a quarter of a century back, for similar work in other
fields of the law.
Lewis Weinstock.t
t Member of the Bar, Philadelphia.
I. Book Review (1939) 24 MINN. L. Ray. 141.
2. 304 U .S. 64 (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 896.
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